focuses upon recent developments in the abstention doctrine in both diversity and federal question cases. Under this standard, the existence of uncertain state law was a ground for abstention only if such action were required by principles of comity or would enable a federal court to avoid determination of a constitutional question. The bases for refusing to exercise jurisdiction, however, was extended by a 1959 decision of the United States Supreme Court. 16 This and subsequent lower court opinions have cast considerable doubt upon the continuing vitality of the policy enunciated in Meredith.
The "Sovereign Prerogative" Theory
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,' 7 the plaintiff commenced an action in the Louisiana state courts to expropriate property pursuant to its power of eminent domain. The case was then removed by the defendant to a federal district court where jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship. Although a Louisiana statute apparently granted the expropriation power sought by the city, the statute had never been interpreted by the Louisiana courts, and in a similar case, the state's attorney general had concluded that the statute did not grant such power. The district court abstained, sua sponte, and remitted the controversy to the state courts. In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court sustained the district court's abstention as a proper exercise of discretion even though no substantial constitutional questions were presented"' and ordinary principles of comity were apparently inapplicable.
The majority in Thibodaux held that abstention Was justified in the triar court's discretion 9 because the eminent domain question was "intimately involved with the sovereign prerogative." 20 Since "the issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation The dissenters argued that merely frivolous constitutional questions would not justify abstention on the ground of avoidance. Id. at 33.
2' In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), decided upon the same day as Thibodaux, the Court affirmed 5-4 the Third Circuit's reversal of a district court abstention and dismissal order. In Mashuda plaintiff sought the ouster of the county and its lessee from certain lands previously taken from the plaintiff in eminent domain proceedings. The sole question presented was whether the land had been taken for a public purpose as required by Pennsylvania law. The Court held abstention inappropriate since state law was "clear," and no questions of avoidance or comity were presented.
The Justices in the majority in Thibodaux dissented in Mashuda, with the exception of Mr. Justice Stewart who joined the former dissenters. Stewart professed to distinguish the two cases on the ground that Mashuda presented a question of disputed fact, which a federal court could dispose of as competently as a state court. 20 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
[ Vol. 1965: 102 interpreted in local settings," 2 ' the federal courts should have deferred to the state tribunals "in a matter close to the political interests of a State" 2 2 in order to promote "harmonious federal-state relations. ' 23 Furthermore, the exercise of federal jurisdiction was not abdicated but merely "postponed," as the district court was to retain jurisdiction and the litigation might return there following a declaratory judgment of the state law by the Louisiana court.
4
Mr. Justice Brennan, vigorously dissenting, was unable to discern a correlation between eminent domain and the sovereign prerogative so compelling as to distinguish expropriation proceedings from many other state functions. 2 5 He asserted that the majority rationale was a subterfuge designed to disguise a desire to avoid determination of difficult state law questions and a distaste for the congressional mandate to exercise diversity jurisdiction. 26 The Justice warned that the majority was fashioning "an opening wedge for District Courts to refer hard cases of state law to state courts in even the routine diversity negligence and contract actions."-27 Wholesale invocation of abstention in such cases, he warned, would result in "unnecessary delay, waste, and added expense for the parties." 28 In two recent cases decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,29 these fears have been realized.
The "Effective State Remedy" Qualification
In Green v. American Tobacco Co., 30 a decedent's widow and estate brought a diversity action to recover damages for his death from lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking cigarettes manufactured by the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed judgment for the defendant, holding that in the absence of negligence, a manu-facturer could not be liable under Florida law as an absolute insurer of its product. On rehearing, however, the court certified the question 3 ' of absolute liability for breach of implied warranty 2 to the Florida Supreme Court under a novel statutory provision.
33
Without discussing the propriety of certification solely on the basis of the uncertainty of state law, 3 4 the Fifth Circuit stressed the importance of the question and the inability of the federal judges to agree on the position which Florida courts would adopt.
By themselves, Thibodaux and Green might have been viewed merely as narrow exceptions to the general rule that federal courts will not abstain unless prompted by principles of comity or the presence of a federal constitutional question. 30 Thibodaux might
The parties were directed, if possible, to stipulate the questions to be certified.
In the -event that the parties could not agree upon stipulation, the court ordered them to file a report, accompanied by relevant briefs. 304 F.2d at 86. 32 The Supreme Court of Florida replied to the certification in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (1962). Contrary to the original federal determination, the state court found that "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or oppor. tunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty." 154 So. 2d at 170. Upon subse. quent proceedings, the court of appeals remanded the case to the federal district court for a new trial upon the specific question of whether defendant's cigarettes were reasonably fit for human consumption. However, the parties were bound by the answers to other specific interrogatories submitted to the jury in the first trial. REv. 413, 431 (1962) . Certification is frequently attacked upon the grounds that questions certified are "abstract" or "academic" and will not insure a meaningful rendition of state law. See, e.g., 21 LA. L. REv. 777, 780-82 (1961 "Judge Brown did suggest the need for limits on the doctrine "lest each and every diversity case on its initial filing be immediately turned out to graze in the state pasture." 328 F.2d at 488.
could result in a total abdication of diversity jurisdiction. 6 0 Were uniformity of result the categorical imperative,6 0° federal courts 0 0 The federal obligation to adjudicate diversity cases is conferred by statute. 28 850, 858-61 (1964) . The justifications advanced for diversity jurisdiction today are: (I) the existence of bias in various regions of the country against persons from other regions-more dramatically reflected in state than federal proceedings; (2) localization of place of trial by state venue provisions and subsequent "machinations [against outsiders] of the 'local court house gang' "; (3) inadequacies in state court procedures; (4) congestion in the state courts in great metropolitan areas; (5) the avoidance of friction between the citizens of the several states that might be caused by state litigation favorable to the instater; (6) the need to provide the best possible forums for aliens to satisfy the demands of world opinion. ALI, STUDY OF REv. 1049 REv. (1964 . Diversity jurisdiction has recently been the object of proposals that would effect a reduction in the number of diversity actions brought in the federal courts. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent-Draft No. 2, 1964) , which concludes that while "diversity jurisdiction continues to serve an important function in our federal system . . . it presently extends to substantial classes of cases which have no valid justification for being in the national courts ..... Id. at 1-2.
OOa One case in which obeisance to Erie is reflected is Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hallatt, 326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 932 (1964) . There plaintiff was awarded a judgment against the defendant insurance company in the lower federal court. The court of appeals found error in the first trial and remanded the case. On retrial the jury found for the defendant. While that finding was pending before the court of appeals upon review, the state courts expressly rejected the federal interpretation of state law that found error in the first trial. Consequently, the court of appeals reinstated the initial verdict and judgment. Ordinarily, the prior finding of the court of appeals
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might be incapable of declaring state law. 6 ' Uncertainty of state law should not, by itself, preclude the competence of federal courts to decide the controversy.
62
Although Judge Brown contended that federal jurisdiction was not abandoned in Delaney because ihe district court retained jurisdiction over the controversy, once the state court has declared the law the parties' rights will be established where facts are undisputed. 63 Moreover, where the facts are disputed, the parties would have to submit these factual issues to state adjudication in the event a declaratory judgment or certification procedure is unavailable. In these situations, diversity jurisdiction might be altogether nullified by a plea of res judicata upon return to the district court. (1961) .
Remission under these circumstances may be appropriate where both the parties are willing to cooperate to enable a state court determination to be rendered. However, a hostile litigant can sabotage subsequent state court proceedings. Therefore, it is submitted that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, remission to the state courts in such cases is unjustifiable. See cases cited note 37 supra. Even though the federal court retains jurisdiction and can recall the, case if either party becomes recalcitrant, the opportunity for dilatory maneuvers seems too great. Furthermore, failure of a party to secure the authoritative state' determination because of lack of a proper remedy or technical procedural defects should not be deemed as forfeiting the right of the litigant to return to the federal courts.
"0 328 F.2d at 485. See Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT art. 2524-1 (1951).
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clearly outweigh the delay and expense attendant upon even the most sophisticated procedural devices available upon remission. 0 7 The lower federal courts should heed the language of Meredith v. Winter Haven 68 and confine abstention to the exceptional case in which it is justified by a full consideration of all the relevant factors.
Having ascertained that a state remedy is available, courts should proceed to determine the magnitude of local concern with the particular questions presented, 6 9 the degree to which determination necessarily involves a fundamental choice between valid conflicting policies, 70 the probability of an erroneous evaluation of state law, 7 ' the impact of additional delay, 7 2 the ability of the parties to assume 867 (1964) as a guide for determining when a given area of state law is sufficiently important to the state to justify abstention. State constitutional and statutory law would be given highest priority. State courts would be presumed to be more expert in interpreting this body of law than their federal counterparts. State common law would generally be of less significance; federal competence in this area is probably not significantly less than that of state tribunals. Nevertheless, it seems readily evident that any categorical analysis is doomed to failure. The important question is not the particular variety of state law, but rather its impact upon state policy.
7OThis consideration may be distinguished from the importance of the decision to the state in that it revolves around the nature of the judicial function. In some cases more than others, the issues seem to be definable in terms of "pure" policymaking. Only the courts charged with political responsibility for making such policy evaluations appear to be able to render meaningful decisions, simply because no other court possesses the unique sovereign authority to choose between policy alteratives. For example, plaintiff brings a diversity action in a federal district court in state X for wrongful death arising out of an airplane crash in state Y. Plaintiff claims that under state X choice-of-law rules, the courts of that state would apply its own wrongful death act. Defendant claims that state X courts would apply state Y's wrongful death act. There have been no recent decisions on the point by the state X courts, but the older state X cases hold that the law of the place of injury "'Questions in this respect would involve the difficulty of the state law issues presented, the res judicata ramifications of abstention versus federal determination, and the number and extent of the interests of both sides to the litigation. As an additional consideration, state courts with crowded dockets may be unwilling to consider the controversy-particularly if the influx of cases is viewed as a shirking of responsibility by federal courts.
72 "We also cannot ignore that abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts .... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time .. " Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-79 (1964 According to Meredith, abstention should not be used to encroach upon the duty of federal courts to decide diversity cases except in exceptional circumstances. Thibodaux, Green and Delaney, however, have obviated the necessity of exceptional circumstances both by failing to articulate an evaluation of the above standards and by failing to weigh them against one another. Unfortunately, these precedents may prompt wholesale abnegation of diversity jurisdiction in cases which might not involve significant state policies or a substantial risk of error. 74 That a defendant who has removed the controversy from the state courts attaches little significance to a state determination of uncertain state law questions is probable, but not necessarily true. The defendant may desire access to federal discovery procedures or prefer federal fact-finding, even though he desires a state court determination of the relevant law. But see American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin, 829 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court declined to abstain because the party urging the lack of clarity of state law had chosen to litigate in the federal forum and had failed to institute a declaratory judgment proceeding within the state courts. A motion to stay the district court proceedings pending institution of a suit in the state courts had been overruled by the district court. The court of appeals concluded that this factor was of "little significance," since permission from the district court was not required for institution of a state action. 829 F.2d at 179-80. See also Colbrese v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 978 (D. Mont. 1964 ). There the court, after citing Delaney with approval, refused to abstain in a diversity action involving uncertain state law, stating-"It is difficult to understand why the defendant has not sought a declaratory judgment from the Supreme Court of Montana." Id. at 982.
7r The fact that a thorough evaluation requires a balancing of many factors should not, in and of itself, invest the trial court with discretion or suggest that the trial court's analysis would be free from appellate review. 985 (1964) . The scope of allowable judicial review of the lower court's determination upon the abstention question, however, should probably be minimized in order to prevent dilatory maneuvering and consequent delay by frequent reversals of such orders after the trial court has entered a judgment upon the merits. Federal determination of the case is regarded as anathema, because a forthcoming federal decision reviewing the disposition of a controversy before administrative remedies are exhausted may disrupt the regulatory scheme of a state and generate federal-state friction. Abstention by a federal district court is justified because: (1) respect for the administrative process dictates that it should be allowed to culminate before outside intervention; (2) the likelihood that an eventual disruption will occur is diminished because of the high attrition rate upon the road to Supreme Court review.
[Vol. 1965: 102 upon both state and federal issues on the state level.
7 9 A different situation is presented where administrative primacy in not involved and an abstaining federal court retains jurisdiction over the controversy. In a few such instances, only specific issues of state law have been remitted for determination." 0 Usually, however, abstaining courts have couched their orders of remission in general terms, stating only that the parties are to repair to the state courts for determination of state law.
81

State Court Consideration of the Federal Question
In the latter situation, the remitted parties are faced with the problem of obtaining the necessary state law determination while preserving their right to return to the federal courts against a claim of res judicata. JumDMNTs § 63, comment a (1942) . Ordinarily the doctrine of res judicata would bar relitigation of federal questions that might have been litigated before the state courts.
8-353 U.S. 364 (1957) . The Windsor litigation has been aptly characterized as "an amazing odyssey possible only in our federal system." Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358, 1363 (1960) . The federal district court in which suit was filed abstained, and the Supreme Court affirmed the abstention order. 347 U.S. 901 (1954) , affirming per curiam 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953) . Plaintiffs then entered the state courts, making timely arguments only as to the applicability of the state statutes which they had previously attempted to attack in the federal courts on Constitutional grounds. The Alabama supreme court ruled against the plaintiffs on the state law issue, but did not render judgment on the federal questions. 262 Ala. 285, 286, 78 So. 2d 646, 647 (1955) . Plaintiffs then returned to the federal district court, which held the statute constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1956 ). The Supreme Court. reversed the federal district court, reasoning that the state court's decision was only a "bare adjudication," not authoritative on the questions of state law, because the plaintiffs had not given the state courts the opportunity to construe state law in the light of their federal constitutional objections. 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam). The plaintiffs reentered the state courts, but the suit was dismissed on the grounds that a justiciable controversy had not been Vol. 1965: 102] abstention must afford the state courts the opportunity to construe state law "in light of the [federal] constitutional objections presented to the district court." 8' 4 Where the state court is not given this opportunity, its decision upon state law is only a "bare adjudication" which affords an insufficient basis for federal disposition of the case. The vexing aspect of the Windsor holding was the Court's failure to prescribe the steps to be taken at the state level to insure that issues of state law are placed in the required constitutional perspective.
According to one view, nothing less than seeking complete adjudication of both state and federal questions would meet the Windsor requirements. 85 However, if a party sought and received binding relief on his federal question in the state courts, res judicata might bar his return to the abstaining federal court with regard to the federal question. Consequently, the statutory right to litigate federal questions in a federal forum would be substantially abrogated. Supreme Court review of an adverse state court determination of federal questions, while still available, 80 ordinarily is an inadequate substitute for initial federal determination. 7 As a general rule, the Supreme Court considers itself bound to accept state determinations of factual issues. 8 Rv. 1358 Rv. , 1360 Rv. -61 (1960 . There it was contended that the state courts need only decide the state law issues. The parties might even be enjoined from presenting their federal questions to the state courts for adjudication and any forthcoming state court determination of the federal questions would be denied res judicata status by the federal courts. "Prerequisites for Supreme Court review include the following: (1) a final decree or judgment; (2) a determination by the highest court in the state in which a decision might be had; (3) the existence of a substantial federal question; (4) a federal question that has been properly raised and reserved as required by state practice; (5) the absence of an independent, non-federal basis which supports the state court's judgment. often turn upon these findings, 89 the impartiality and special competence of federal district courts to decide federal questions is the reason these courts are granted jurisdiction to entertain constitutional questions. 90 Moreover, since the extent of Supreme Court review may rest in the Court's discretion, 9 ' the scope of argument may be more restricted than it would be in lower courts. 92 Thus it is possible that complete adjudication of the federal constitutional question in state courts may deprive the parties of a comprehensive consideration of the federal right in a federal court.
The Parties' Option
In the recent case of England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners 93 the Supreme Court refused to allow Windsor to undermine federal jurisdiction in this manner. In England several chiropractors asserted that the educational requirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act had been applied to them in violation of the 261, 296 (1947) . 1958) . Note, 73 HAitv. L. REv. 1358, 1366, argues that the sole basis for this decision is the view that the Supreme Court's consideration of a petition for certorari is insufficient protection of the litigant's right to a federal forum on federal questions. Furthermore, the argument is advanced that the dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question or a summary affirmance affords no sufficiently greater protection. " [I] n view of the small amount of time which the Court has to consider each appeal, it seems unrealistic to hold that federal claims are barred by a disposition on appeal without full argument." Id. at 1367. 0 2 See note 91 supra. Supreme Court rules limit the duration of oral argument. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 44.
-375 U.S. 411 (1964).
fourteenth amendment. There a three-judge district court was convened on remand 94 from the Fifth Circuit and abstained, sua sponte, 95 on the ground that the state courts might find that the statute did not apply to the plaintiffs 9 8 No appeal was taken from the abstention order. 97 Thereafter the plaintiffs were denied relief in the state courts on both their state and federal questions. 98 When they attempted to return to the abstaining district court, 99 plaintiffs were met with a successful plea of res judicata since the state courts had passed upon federal issues. 100 Pursuant to statute, 1 0 1 plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The decision was reversed by the Court' 0 2 on the basis of the 1, 55 So. 2d 761, the Supreme Court of this state had before it the resolution of every contention made by the plaintiffs herein and that court determined adversely the contentions herein." Id. at 53. The court did agree, however, that whether chiropractry is a "useful profession" and entitled to recognition is "primarily a question of fact." The parties had submitted affidavits debating this question at the trial level and the trial court found adversely to the plaintiffs. Id. at 56. plaintiffs' good-faith reliance on a reasonable misinterpretation of Windsor. 10 3 In establishing a standard for future cases, the Court held that Windsor did not require a remitted litigant to seek final adjudication of his federal claims in the state court, but required him only to "inform" the latter of the existence and nature of his federal constitutional questions. 1 0 4 This would enable him to avoid an anomalous application of res judicata that would bar subsequent federal adjudication of his federal claims. 1 0 5 Recognizing the difficulty of resisting argument of federal claims and the virtual impossibility of preventing a state court from deciding a federal question if it were so inclined, 1 0 6 the Court held that a litigant's right to return "will in all events be preserved' 07 if he makes a formal reservation on the state record of his right to return to federal court for adjudication of his federal claims. 0 8 In the absence of a formal reservation, a plaintiff would be entitled to return if he had not fully litigated his federal question in the state court.
The England decision complements the earlier decision of the Court in NAACP v. Button, 0 9 holding that a party remitted to the state courts by abstention might there elect to litigate all his claims fully and without reservation, thus foregoing his prerogative to return to a federal district court which had retained jurisdiction." 0 Many times a litigant might wish to follow this course in order to avoid the delay and expense attendant upon return to the federal forum."'1
The net result of England and Button is to make three alternative courses of action available to a litigant remitted to the state courts by abstention. He may (1) seek final adjudication of all his claims, both state and federal, in the state courts; (2) [Vol. 1965: 102 reserve his right to return to the federal courts for adjudication of his federal questions; or (3) proceed in the state courts without revealing which course he is following, neither formally reserving his federal claims nor requesting binding adjudication thereof in the state courts.
(1) Final Adjudication in the State Courts.
The possibility of advantage to a plaintiff in seeking final adjudication of all claims in the state courts was vitiated by dictum in England. There the majority stated that despite a plaintiff's elec-In the absence of a specific requirement that the defendant reserve his federal questions at the commencement of state court litigation, it would seem that the defendant is presented with a double opportunity to win the case. Although the plaintiff who elects to present his federal claim would be bound by a state court adjudication thereof, the defendant, by refusing to oppose the argument, could exercise his removal power at the termination of unfavorable litigation. Whether the defendant's legitimate interest in a federal forum warrants a delayed removal power is questionable. Under present law a defendant may remove to a federal court only when the plaintiff has asserted a valid federal claim on the face of his complaint;-6 if the federal question is raised by way of defense, there is no basis for removal."
7 Some commentators argue that this situation is exactly the opposite of what should be the case. 118 Since the only reason for removal in many cases is the fear that federal claims may be treated "ungenerously" by state courts," 9 if the plaintiff is willing to submit determination of his claim to a state court, it seems anomalous to accord the defendant the right to remove. This would seem particularly true if, as England suggests, the defendant is accorded a double opportunity to try the facts of his case.
(2) The Formal Reservation Even if defendant does not reserve the right to return to federal court, the formal reservation procedure outlined in England presents difficult questions as applied to plaintiffs. 20 Mr. Justice Dougvariant ruling of law on facts different from those established in the records of the state court proceedings. See Id. § 748. This result would create additional problems. Since the state court determination of state law would be based upon a set of facts different from those established by the federal tribunal, it is not clear whether the state court decision would be regarded as "authoritative" as to the matters of uncertain state law of which clarification was sought by abstention. Consequently, contradictory findings of fact might be deemed to require another order of abstention by the federal district court. Cf. 64 COLUmn. L. Rgv. 766, 773 (1964 las in a concurring opinion stated that the formal reservation procedure is an unnecessary trap for the unwary, in that it establishes an "exotic rule of federal procedure" with which most attorneys will not be familiar. 1 1 ' He suggested, therefore, that res judicata should not bar a party from returning to federal court unless that party has "elected" state court adjudication by a request for Supreme Court review of a state decision; 122 until that step is taken, "he is only doing what he is required to do"' 123 by virtue of abstention.
Another objection is that the procedure may prove unworkable in certain cases. 124 State courts may be reluctant to decide cases in piecemeal fashion by ruling only on state law questions, or they may conclude that they are being asked to render a forbidden advisory opinion.1 25 the state statute on its face. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958) . The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Defendants there contended that since the federal district court had retained jurisdiction over the federal issues, the state court's decision upon those questions represented mere dictum. The Supreme Court held that the state court properly passed upon the validity of a state statute upon its face, and indicated that the plaintiff could return to the federal district court to attack the application of the state statutes. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 238 (1959) .
No clarification is made in England as to whether a litigant may reserve a right to return to an abstaining federal district court when his federal question concerns only the validity of a state statute upon its face, or whether it is necessary for him to enter a formal reservation of his right to return to the federal district court when he challenges the constitutionality of a state's status as applied. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion makes no explicit distinction between invalid-on-face and invalid-as-applied objections, thus indicating that both situations will be treated alike and the Lassiter distinction vitiated. However, Brennan also stated that "in cases where, but for the application of the abstention doctrine, the primary fact determination would have been by the District Court, a litigant may not be unwillingly deprived of that determination." 375 U.S. at 417. (Emphasis added.) This language may serve merely to distinguish the types of cases subject to the England rule from those involving the primacy of state regulatory agencies, since England is inapplicable to the Burford line of decisions. See note 78 supra.
121 "Those who read this opinion may have adequate warning. But this opinion, like most, will become an obscure one-little known to the Bar. Lawyers do not keep up with all the nuances of court opinions, especially those touching on as exotic a rule of federal procedure as the one we evolve today. I fear therefore that the rule we announce today will be a veritable trap." Id. at 435. 222 375 U.S. at 429.
123 Ibid. 12, An example of the weaknesses in the England approach may be presented when a plaintiff brings suit in a state court and the defendant removes to a federal district court which abstains. Under these circumstances there seems to be no legitimate reason for allowing the plaintiff to reserve the right to return to the federal tribunal, since he has previously indicated a preference for a state court adjudication of his federal claims. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of North Kansas City, 276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1960) (fact that defendant procured removal from state court does not bar invocation of abstention).
Even if state courts determine they are able to decide only state law issues, it can be contended that formal reservation does not insure a meaningful rendition of state law. The primary reason for Windsor's requirement that state courts must be apprised of federal questions in a remitted case is that a state court may take greater liberties in construing a statute to preserve its constitutionality.
126 It might be argued that if the plaintiff enters a formal reservation, a state court need not decide the federal question; thus it might feel no compulsion to undertake a saving construction of state law, and state statutes might become increasingly vulnerable to constitutional attack. Nevertheless, the responsibility of state courts to perpetuate state policy would seem to be sufficient motivation to construe state law in a liberal and saving manner. When state courts are apprised of the federal question, 127 this responsibility remains even though the plaintiff has the power to transfer ultimate responsibility for decision to the federal judiciary.
(3) The Ambivalent Course of Action Another complication under England is presented when the plaintiff elects to proceed in the state courts without entering a formal reservation of his right to return to a federal forum, and yet seeks to preserve that right by minimal compliance with the requirements of Windsor. 12 8 So long as the litigant merely "informs" the state court of his federal questions, his right to return is protected. Nevertheless, once a party undertakes to do more than "inform" the state court, England suggests that he may be deemed to however, that the decision of only a fragment of a case, with the ultimate power to give judgment left to the federal court, is an advisory opinion beyond their power to render." See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961) which seems to support the view expressed in Note, 73 HAiv. L. Rv. 1358 Rv. , 1361 Rv. (1960 , that the state courts will in all probability respect the wishes of the federal courts in such cases and decide only the state law issues. If the state courts refuse to pass upon the federal questions urged, presumably a party may return to the federal forum to litigate those issues even where he has fully litigated his federal questions in the state courts.
1 "But cf. have elected in favor of final state court adjudication.
129
Attempting to hedge, therefore, would be extremely dangerous. The Court in England did not specify what actions would exceed the bounds of "information," and a party might be hard pressed to say with certainty that he had complied with England and Windsor.
Nevertheless, in certain cases a party who is uncertain about pressing his federal claim in the state court might find it advantageous to avoid a specific reservation which at the outset would commit him to return to the federal courts. He might be able to forestall an election so long as the applicable state procedure provides an opportunity to initiate a new theory of relief based on a .federal question. Conversely, if, as England suggests, mere "argument" of a federal claim is an election in favor of final state court adjudication, a party who anticipates favorable state court adjudication of federal questions may be able to finalize the forthcoming decision by launching an eleventh-hour "argument"' 130 of those questions and seeking binding relief in state appellate proceedings. Clearly, however, the Court intended that reservation by a refusal to argue was necessary only to protect the remitted plaintiff who has inadvertently failed to enter a formal reservation.' 8 1 The procedural antics mentioned above might be precluded if this alternative method of reserving the right to return to federal court were conditioned on a good faith error in failing to formally reserve a return to federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The sweeping encroachment upon federal jurisdiction advocated by Judge Brown in Delaney would appear to be totally unjustified. 192 Constriction of diversity jurisdiction is a matter properly left in the hands of Congress. A recent study of the American Law Institute concludes that federal diversity jurisdiction is unwarranted "when a person's involvement with a state is such as to eliminate any real risk of prejudice against him as a stranger and make it unreason-[Vol. 1965: 102 It is true that determination of questions of uncertain state law might result in erroneous decisions, and federal courts may sometimes face the unpleasant task of conceding the "error" of their previous interpretation. 33 Nevertheless, the parties have had their day in court,1 3 4 and their dispute has been settled by the rule of law. The risk of erroneous interpretation is but one factor which federal courts should consider in determining whether a court is justified in imposing the disadvantages of abstention upon the parties.
In those cases where abstention is ordered to avoid unnecessary decision of. a federal constitutional question, the doctrine would be better served by modifying the position advanced in England. The defendant's removal power should be limited to express reservations at the initiation of suit in the state court. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestion that only a request for Supreme Court review should be deemed an election in favor of "final" state court adjudication of federal questions would avoid most of the procedural entanglements suggested by the majority opinion. 2, 1964) . The Institute proposes, therefore, to forbid diversity to be invoked (1) by a plaintiff in his home state; (2) by a "foreign" corporation in the state of a "local establishment"--when the action involves activities of the latter; (3) by a natural persofi in the state in which he has his principle place of business or employment; (4) by an out-of-state fiduciary in the state of the decedent or ward. Id. at 2-5. 155 Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964) observes that the existence of a single federal precedent upon a matter of uncertain state law may be of benefit to the state courts, by acting as a gadfly. The federal determination may provoke learned commentary and provide working experience with a particular rule. The state courts then have the advantage of a trial balloon, without paying the price of a stare decisis determination.
'1, See note 57 supra. 111 It is arguable that this method would afford the plaintiff a double opportunity to triumph by fully litigating in the state courts and then returning to the federal forum should he be unsuccessful. However, the likelihood that state courts will treat the plaintiff's claim with undue generosity seems particularly remote. If the plaintiff is able to prevail on constitutional challenges to state legislation at the state level, it is extremely probable that he would also prevail in a federal court.
